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DESIGN LIABILITY AND STATE OF THE




Viewed generally, the decade of the 1970's was one in which
the American law of products liability showed signs of great uncer-
tainty. Though the doctrine of so-called "strict tort liability" in-
creasingly was adopted, the courts left significant questions to be
resolved later on a case-by-case basis. For example, how "strict"
was this liability to be? Would a manufacturer's exercise of reason-
able care or even a high degree of prudence avoid "strict liability?"
What role is to be played by a manufacturer's compliance with the
applicable "state of the art?" Which defenses would be available?
How would the new doctrine be applied at the trial level? These
and a host of other questions were not conclusively answered dur-
ing the last decade. There are signs that in the decade of the 1980's
some uncertainty will continue.
The American common-law experience has been paralleled to
some extent in Europe, where an attempt has been made to articu-
late products liability rules through a so-called "Draft Directive"
devised by the Commission of the European Communities. While
this European attempt to formulate products law has worthwhile
objectives, certain Commission proposals seem to disregard lessons
to be learned from years of a somewhat discouraging American ex-
perience in struggling to define the manufacturer's responsiblity.
Both the American and European efforts, continuing into this
* This Article expands upon concepts first advanced by the author in v. Hillsen, The
Problems of New Development: Facts and Cases From the Motor Industry, PROD. LAB.
INT'L, Jan. 1981, at 2; and v. Holsen, Neue Entwicklung zur Produzentenhaftung in den
U.S.A., 1981 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 1.
t Consultant, author and lecturer regarding the Commission of the European Commu-
nities Proposal for a Council Directive relating to the approximation of the laws, regula-
tions, and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective
products; Head of Foreign Legal Section of Volkswagenwerk AG; Research Fellow, Max-
Planck-Institute of Foreign and International Private Law, 1962-69; doctorate of law, Uni-
versity of Hamburg, 1973.
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decade, have great significance. Desirable and necessary products
are being sold on both sides of the ocean. Liability risks for Ameri-
can and European manufacturers are enormous. They obviously
impact product availability, prices, jobs and international com-
merce in general. It is therefore important to dispel uncertainties
about what the manufacturer's responsibility really is.
This Article focuses upon some of the legal considerations as-
sociated with the development and design of complex products.
Various categories of design developments are identified, with par-
ticular attention to the realistic role of "state of the art" and time
elements, as influential factors in formulating design liability.
American and European approaches defining design responsibility
-re briefly surveyed to discern whether they properly recognize
"fault" and "state of the art" considerations.
THE DEFECTIVE DESIGN ISSUE
Perhaps no products liability issue in the United States has
stimulated more controversy than the problem of defining just
what constitutes a "defect" under strict tort liability principles.'
I See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to War-
ranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAw. L. Rv. 593, 597-602 (1980); Hoenig,
Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Approach? 8 Sw. U.L. REv.
109, 111 (1976); Phillips, A Synopsis of the Developing Law of Products Liability, 28 DRAKE
L. REv. 317, 322-23 (1978).
Whether liability is predicated on negligence or strict products liability, a plaintiff must
establish that the product was "defective" in some manner when it left the manufacturer's
control. Browder v. Pittigrew, 541 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tenn. 1976). Since the seminal case of
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962),
courts and commentators alike have grappled with the problem of defining "defective prod-
uct." See, e.g., Weakley v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 515 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th Cir. 1975);
Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1974); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965). In Greenman, the California Supreme Court, without defining "defect," held
that liability exists when the product "proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human
being." 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. The Restatement of Torts,
which states that a seller is liable for damages for a product which is "in a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer," RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §
402A (1965), defines "defective condition" as "a condition not contemplated by the ultimate
consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." Id., Comment g. The "unreason-
ably dangerous" standard was seized upon by many courts as the basis for recognizing strict
tort liability for products without the need to establish privity. Wade, On Product "Design
Defects" and their Actionability, 33 VANn. L. REv. 551, 555 (1980). Later variations on this
standard were applied which utilized the reasonable expectations of the consumer to deter-
mine if a product was defective, reflecting some of the influence of contract law and breach
of warranty. See, e.g., Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis.
2d 326, 230 N:W.2d 794 (1975); Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does A Product
Have to Be? 42 IND. L.J. 301, 305-07 (1967). Other courts adopted a variation that was more
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While courts and commentators originally faced the problem of es-
tablishing standards of liability for mismanufactured products2 or
impurities in food,' the same standards are not easily transferred
to issues of product design and failure to warn. In manufacturing
defect cases, the product, through mismanufacture or inadequate
quality control, is faulty because it fails to meet the manufacturer's
standards. Defects can be identified by reference to the manufac-
reflective of tort law-whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer with knowledge of the
defect would market the product. E.g., Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386
A.2d 816 (1978), overruled on other grounds, 81 N.J. 150, 404 A.2d 140 (1979); Phillips v.
Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 581, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974). See also Keeton, Product Liability
and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973). Some courts, however, have re-
jected the Restatement definition of "unreasonably dangerous" as too closely akin to a neg-
ligence standard. See Caterpiller Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Cronin v.
J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). Recently, the
California Supreme Court, in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., elaborated on its definition of
design defect and proposed two alternatives: the first alternative is based upon ordinary
consumer expectations, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237
(1978), the second alternative employs a risk-utility standard but places on the defendant
the burden of proving that the merits of the design outweighed its dangers. 20 Cal. 3d 413,
432, 573 P.2d 443, 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 233 (1978); see note 10 and accompanying text
infra.
2 See, e.g., McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1965); Holmquist v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 261 N.W.2d 516 (Iowa Ct. App. 1977); Wyatt v. Winnebago
Indus. 566 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tenn. Ct. App. i977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
Appendix (1965).
' Connell v. Norton Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 187 Kan. 393, 357 P.2d 804, 808 (1960); Le
Blanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873, 875 (1952); Swift &
Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203, 206 (1959). The Restatement standard, in its
initial draft, applied only to food, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (prelim.
draft no. 6, 1958), and stated that food products must be "in a condition dangerous to the
consumer." Id. The final draft was changed to "defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous" as an assurance that the section would be interpreted to mean unwholesome food.
AMERICAN LAW INSTrruTE, 1961 PROCEEDING 87-89. Later, when section 402A was expanded
to include all defective products, this definition was not modified. See Wade, On the Nature
of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MIss. L.J. 825, 831 n.26 (1973).
" For the past 15 years, following the formulation of the Restatement standard, courts
have struggled to reconcile what was intended as a standard for product mismanufacture or
defective construction with the divergent considerations presented by design and duty to
warn cases. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILrrY ACT, § 104 Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed.
Reg. 62,714, 62,722 (1979) [hereinafter cited as UPLA]. Although the failure to warn of a
dangerous propensity has sometimes been characterized as a separate category of product
defect, see 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODuCTs LLABmrrY § 16 A [4][f][i] (1980), failure
to warn has also been viewed as a type of design defect. Comment, The Failure to Warn
Defect After Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.: Preservation of the Limited Duty and Demise
of the Knowledge Requirement Defense, 14 U.S.F.L. REv. 309, 314 & n.38 (1980). Both
design and failure to warn defects present similar problems regarding the extent to which
the reasonableness of the manufacturer's behavior and state of the art factors can be ex-
cluded from the critical determination of whether a defect exists. See note 79 and accompa-
nying text infra.
DESIGN LIABILITY
turer's own specifications for the product.5 In design defect cases,
however, the product is made as its manufacturer intended but the
claimant's contention is that the entire product line is defective in
some way. The reasonableness of th6 manufacturer's design choice
clearly is in issue and the determination of "defect" becomes much
more complex.6 While scholarly debate has focused upon the
proper role of "negligence" factors in a strict liability cause of ac-
tion,7 evidence of the manufacturer's "reasonableness" has been
admissible in most cases by some variation of a risk/utility balanc-
ing test or one based upon the reasonable expectations of consum-
ers.' With few exceptions, no court appears to have imposed true
"strict liability" on manufacturers for design defect, despite much
language in the cases to the contrary.9 Instead, nearly all tests for
6 See Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Approach?,
8 Sw. L. REv. 109, 118 (1976); Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect"
in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 559, 562 (1969). It is a
fairly easy matter to find strict liability in tort for manufacturing error, regardless of the
particular test that is applied, since defectiveness is ascertained by reference to the intended
condition of the product. See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRmDmAN, supra note 4, at § 16 A[4][f][i]
n.5; Wade, supra note 3, at 828.
6 Most courts and commentators have recognized that, in any viable definition of de-
sign defect, it is necessary to consider not only the product, but also the conduct of the
manufacturer. See Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 971 (4th Cir. 1971); Dorsey v.
Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 758-60 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Yoder Co. v. General
Copper & Brass Co., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Brady v. Melody Homes Mfg., 121 Ariz.
253, 589 P.2d 896, 902 (Ct. App. 1978); Wade, supra note 3, at 841. Some courts have stated
that strict liability is an inappropriate standard for design cases. E.g., Swartz v. General
Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 628, 378 N.E.2d 61, 62 (1978); see UPLA, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg.
62,714 (1979). Cf. Cline v. Prowler Indus. Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 974 (1980) (rejecting appli-
cablity of strict liability in sales cases and holding that U.C.C. implied warranty provisions
preempt the field). But compare Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d
118 (1975) and Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737, 747 (1974)
with Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). One commentator
has suggested that because of the complex policy considerations involved, the courts are not
the proper forum for establishing standards for design safety, and has called for an end to
"judicial coin-flipping." Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 CoLum. L. REv. 1531, 1558 (1973). See also Owens
v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App. 74, 80, 268 N.W.2d 291, 294 (1978); Note, Reforming
the Law of Consumer Recovery and Enterprise Liability Through the Uniform Commercial
Code, 60 VA. L. REv. 1013 (1974).
7 Compare Hoenig, Product Design and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Ap-
proach?, 8 Sw. L. REv. 109 (1976) with Twerski, Corporations Face Dilemma in Rulings on
Design v. Manufacturing Defects, N.Y.L.J., March 2, 1981, at 4, col. 1.
8 See notes 34-76 and accompanying text infra.
UPLA § 104, Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,723; Henderson, Manufactur-
ers' Liability for Defective Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C.L. REv. 625, 634-
35 (1978). Cf. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978). In Barker, the court purported to reject negligence concepts in favor of a more pure
1981]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:450
design defect determinations applied by United States courts re-
quire some consideration of existing scientific knowledge, techno-
logical feasibility and economic practicality at the time of manu-
facture.10 Nevertheless, because many courts appear to instruct
strict liability standard. It is doubtful, however, that Barker conclusively eliminates consid-
eration of fault, and hence, does not appear to impose truly strict liability. See id. at 432,
573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238; Comment, The Failure to Warn Defect After Barker
v. Lull Engineering Co.: Preservation of the Limited Duty and Demise of the Knowledge
Requirement Defense, 14 U.S.F.L. Rav. 309, 334 (1980). While recognizing that in design
cases, as a practical matter, it is impossible to exclude considerations such as the feasibility
of alternative safer designs, or risk/utility factors, the court sought to cut the ties to a negli-
gence standard by shifting to the manufacturer the burden of proving that "on balance, the
benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design." Id. at
432, 573 P.2d at 456-57, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38. Shifting the burden of proof in this man-
ner is inappropriate, both in view of established tort principles of liability, see Kalven,
Torts: The Quest for Appropriate Standards, 53 CALin. L. REv. 189 (1965), and because of
the severe financial consequences that manufacturers face when an entire product line is
challenged. UPLA, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,724. As to the financial consequences, see
Gibson, When Attorneys Prosper, FORBES, Mar. 30, 1981, at 43-44. Therefore, the Barker
approach has been criticized in commentary, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 644 n. 261,
and only one other court appears to have adopted the California standard as of this writing.
See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979). In Pennsylvania, the high-
est court held that manufacturers are "guarantors" of the safety of their products, Azzarello
v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 559-60 n.12, 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 n.12 (1978). It remains to
be seen whether the actual application of this statement by Pennsylvania courts will lean
towards imposition of a very strict liability, or whether this merely amounts to a label used
by the court to distinguish the more traditional cause of action in negligence.
10 See, e.g., Schell v. AMF, Inc., 567 F.2d 1259 (3d Cir. 1977); Dreisonstok v. Volkswa-
genwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1072-73 (4th Cir. 1974); Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753
(E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Yoder Co. v. General Copper & Brass Co., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d
Cir. 1973); Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976); Aller v. Rodgers
Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152,
386 A.2d 816 (1978), overruled on other grounds, 81 N.J. 150, 404 A.2d 140 (1979); Phillips
v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v.
Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975). Evidence of the reasonableness of the manu-
facturer's design choice usually has been admissible in strict liability actions in one form or
another. E.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976); Jeng v.
Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1362 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979);
Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1976); Roach v. Kononen,
269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974); see 44 Fed. Reg. 62,723 (1979). Even though some courts
and commentators insist that they are utilizing a strict liability approach for design defect
cases, in reality, they often are employing a risk/utility balancing approach that necessarily
considers the reasonableness of the design choice and some state of the art criteria. See, e.g.,
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 493, 525 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1974); Birnbaum,
supra note 1, at 619.
Outside the United States, also, proof of responsible and careful design behavior is rele-
vant on the issue of liability in design cases. See, e.g., Viney, L'Application du Droit Com-
mun de la Responsabilitg aux Fabricants et Distributeurs de Produit, LA RFsPONSAniLrrE
DES FABRIcANTS Er DisTmuTEURs 69, 70-75 (Paris 1975). See generally H.D. Tebbens, IN-
TERNATIONAL PRODUCT LLIABmrry 52 (English law), 85-86 (French law) (1979); v. Hallsen, The
Status of Product Liability-Proceedings of an International Colloquium in Cologne (1977);
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juries to generally "consider" such factors without actually provid-
ing concrete guidelines for evaluating them,"" results are often un-
predictable and sometimes conflicting.12 Judges and juries are un-
certain as to how "strict" the manufacturer's liability for product
design should be.13 Attorneys find it difficult to advise their clients
with certainty and often will refer to vague standards currently
employed by the courts. 4 Since strict tort liability is, in part,
based upon the concept of so-called "spreading the risk,' 5 and in-
v. Hillsen, The Definition of "Defect" in the Proposed EEC Directive, 1978 QuAIrry AssuR-
ANCE 53.
" See Keeton, Product Liability and the Automobile, 9 FORUM 1, 2 (1973); Raleigh,
The "State of the Art" in Product Liability: A New Look at an Old "Defense," 4 Omo
N.U.L. REv. 249, 250-52 (1977); UPLA § 104, Analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,723 (1979).
12 See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49
U.S.L.W. 3619 (Feb. 24, 1981); note 63 and accompanying text infra.
13 For a discussion of the various standards applied in design defect cases, see Seattle-
First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975) (applies unreasonably
dangerous standard). See also Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492, 525 P.2d
1033, 1038-39 (1974) (reasonably prudent manufacturer standard); Estate of Ryder v. Kelly-
Springfield Tire Co., 91 Wash. 2d 111, 587 P.2d 160 (1978) (reasonable expectations of ordi-
nary user); Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 383, 482 P.2d 681, 684, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 769, 772 (1971) (no one definition of defect has been accepted by courts).
14 One commentator has summed up the problem in this manner:
How frustrating it must be, indeed almost ludicrous, for designers and busi-
nessmen to be told by their lawyers that enormous responsibilities and costs are to
be defined by such vagaries as "unreasonably dangerous," or the "average quality
of like products," or the "reasonable expectations of consumers," or that a prod-
uct must be "reasonably suitable for its intended use," or that the meaning of
fault is different in each case, or that such risks revolve about some even more
airy meaning of "defect" or notion of "ordinary care" which, in the end, may be
only a function of the training, experience and emotions of jurors.
Raleigh, The "State of the Art" in Product Liability: A New Look at an Old "Defense," 4
OHIO N.U.L. REv. 249, 250-51 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
15 The risk-spreading rationale is premised on the assumption that the cost of product
related injuries is more equitably borne by the manufacturer than by the injured consumer.
The manufacturer is usually in a superior position to compute the probability of defect and
absorb the costs by obtaining insurance or by raising prices. See United States v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 589 F.2d 1305, 1309 (7th Cir. 1978); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod. Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 62-63, 377 P.2d 897, 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700-01 (1962). See generally
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499
(1961); Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 35
(1973). Unlike manufacturing errors, which can be predicted with some degree of mathemat-
ical probability, a design element is not characterized by the failure of one piece out of
possibly thousands to conform to a precise technical norm for the series. Therefore, the
utility of the risk-spreading rationale in the area of design defect has been challenged. In
Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 Vm D. L. Rav. 681, 707
(1980), the author concludes, "Compensation and risk shifting should very probably be
abandoned altogether as 'rationales' of social policy for products liability decision making.
Such arguments are structurally inadequate as decisional tools, since they point in one
1981]
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surance is one major mechanism for achieving such risk distribu-
tion, a climate of uncertainty can affect a vital ingredient of prod-
ucts liability claims resolution, the availability and affordability of
insurance.16 Indeed, increasing insurance rates reflect a deep con-
cern that strict liability in the area of design defect or failure to
warn is fostering legal tests which approach absolute liability.17
In order to meet the broad policy objective of promoting safe
product design,18 it is necessary for designers, manufacturers, and
direction only-toward liability." Id.; accord, UPLA § 104, Analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,722.
Indeed, risk spreading is already embodied in negligence theory, Hoenig, supra note 1, at
129-31, and Dean Prosser has 'called it merely a "make weight" argument for strict tort
liability. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REV. 791, 799-800 (1966).
1 Because of the uncertainty of the standards applied in design defect cases, as well as
the magnitude of the financial risk of having an entire product line declared defective, the
ability of manufacturers to obtain insurance may be threatened. See U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE OF PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT OF THE INSURANCE
STUDY (1977); Product Liability Insurance, A Report of the Subcommittee on Capital, In-
vestment and Business Opportunities of the Committee of Small Businesses, H.R. REP. No.
95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-11 (1978). Product liability insurance and pending claims
increased six-fold during the period from 1971 to 1976, according to one estimate. Bivins,
The Products Liability Crisis: Modest Proposals for Legislative Reform, 11 AKRON L. REv.
595, 596 (1978). See also Raleigh, The "State of the Art" in Product Liability: A New Look
at an Old "Defense," 4 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 249, 251 n.11 (1977). But see O'Connell, Ex-
panding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. REV. 749 (1973);
Comment, The State of the Art Defense in Products Liability: "Unreasonably Dangerous"
to the Injured Consumer, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 915, 915-16 (1980). Thus, insurance may either
be too expensive or impossible to obtain. Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 644 n.261; Gibson,
When Lawyers Prosper, Forbes, Mar. 30, 1981, at 43-44; Hoenig, supra note 1, at 130.
17 There appears to be virtually unanimous agreement among courts and commentators
that strict liability should not be synonymous with absolute liability, see Lartigue v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 35-39 (5th Cir. 1963); Piercefield v. Remington Arms
Co., 375 Mich. 85, 98-99, 133 N.W.2d 129, 135 (1965), and that the need to compensate
victims is not in itself a sufficient ground for imposing liability, R. KEETON & J. O'CoNNmEL,
BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 242 (1965); Wade, supra note 3, at 828. But cf.
Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 559-60 n.12, 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 n.12 (1978). For a
discussion of an approach to compensation which does not consider fault, see O'Connell,
Elective No-Fault Liability by Contract-With or Without an Enabling Statute, 1975 U.
ILL. L.F. 59.
"I A corollary to the risk-spreading rationale is that manufacturers may be induced to
produce safer products because of the increased threat of liability. See Phillips v. Kimwood
Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 503-04, 525 P.2d 1033, 1041-42 (1974). Indeed, the deterrence ratio-
nale has been categorized as the foremost social policy consideration: "The primary goal
underlying [products liability] should be, not compensation, but the reduction of the inci-
dence of injuries." Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 645. See also Bivins, supra note 16, at 603.
The complexity of the social and legal considerations inherent in the formulation of a fair
products liability standard may militate against the application of any single rationale in all
cases. See generally Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656 (1975);
Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REv. 643 (1978);
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engineers to have design standards that can be ascertained before
the product reaches the market and before a product-related in-
jury occurs. A prerequisite for any workable standard of responsi-
bility for design is an understanding of the factors that go into a
design choice and the recognition that no design is "perfect;" the
design development must be viewed in the context of the consider-
ations prevailing at the time of manufacture. Additionally, an ap-
preciation of relevant factors prevailing at conceptual stages of de-
velopment and critical time scales is especially necessary in the
case of complex products.
DESIGN DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS AND TIME FACTORS
The design of any product evolves within the scientific, tech-
nological, and socio-economic environment existing at the time of
the product's conception. Particularly in the case of complex prod-
ucts, the period of conception extends over several years. An exam-
ple is the approximately 5-year conception period for the design
of an automobile. The conception period of a complex product will
be followed by a production period during which the product may
be manufactured for perhaps five or ten years before replacement
by a redesigned or new model. After this production period ends,
the product will continue to be used by consumers. In the example
of the automobile, continued use following purchase might well
amount to twenty years or even more. In the case of capital goods
like stamping machines, much longer periods of use occur.
During the "conception period" there exists .a general state of
technical and scientific knowledge, a complex of prevailing eco-
nomic circumstances, and a certain degree of knowledge about
risks associated with use of the product. The precautionary mea-
sures deemed necessary at that time to make the product as safe
as possible will then be taken. During the "conception phase" the
designers of an automobile, for example, will consider not only the
existing state of scientific and technical knowledge but also weigh
such factors as the cost of incorporating available technology, and
consumer preferences in styling, convenience, and fuel economy.29
Lang, Compensation of Victims-A Pious and Misleading Platitude, 54 CALW. L. REv. 1559
(1966).
19 For an informative description of various considerations that play a part in the man-
ufacturer's design choices, see O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State of the Art: Ter-
minology, Practice and Reform, 11 AKRON L. REv. 627 (1978).
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The manufacturer's practical goal is to produce a safe automobile
that will sell. After a design is finalized which meets these objec-
tives, the automobile will go into serial production for some 5 to 10
years, to be replaced later by a new model.
The taking of precautionary measures to make the car as safe
as possible within the technical and scientific knowledge prevailing
during the conception phase may be illustrated by reference to two
features generally found in the 1978 model automobile. One is so-
called "dual circuit" brakes. This feature provides braking function
via two circuits, thereby allowing significant braking to take place
even if one braking circuit were to fail. If the vehicle possessed
only one braking circuit, a failure in that circuit would result in
loss of braking ability. The dual circuit design, therefore, provides
an added car stopping function-a safety feature.
A second illustrative system is the so-called "three-point"
safety seat belt. This is a seat belt restraint device that provides
both a lap belt restraint as well as an upper torso belt. It is re-
ferred to as a three-point system because its anchorage involves
three points of attachment to the car. The upper torso belt and the
lap belt are attached to each other and can be buckled simultane-
ously by a car occupant in one buckling action by inserting the
strap tongue into a latching receptacle. The three-point belt is dis-
tinguishable from the so-called "two-point" seat belt of which the
ordinary lap belt is an example. It also differs from the "four-
point" belt restraint which was really two independent straps re-
quiring two separate buckling actions (one across the lap and one
across the torso). The three-point seat belt offers upper body re-
straint which the lap belt alone does not. Additionally, it offers
upper and lower body restraint with one buckling action which the
four-point system does not. In the 1980 car model, for example, the
three-point safety belts are made available for the front outside
seats in order to minimize the occupants' injuries even if an acci-
dent occurs despite the sophisticated braking system.
The incorporation of both the dual brake circuit system and
the three-point safety belts at one time necessitated major
redesigns of the vehicle structure. Therefore, it necessarily took
some time after the very first car manufacturer commenced the de-
sign of such features until these safer solutions were incorporated
into the series production cars released to the consumer. The nor-
mal process of a manufacturer with several model lines was to
phase the newer devices or systems into its product lines in accor-
[Vol. 55:450
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dance with cycles of redesign for the particular model. Thus, not
all cars of one manufacturer would be equipped with the newer
systems at the same time. A still further period of time would be
required before all car models of all makes would be equipped with
dual circuit brakes and three-point safety belts.
A very important factor is the necessary lead time for invest-
ment and "tooling up" in the industry. Obviously, it is technically
and economically impossible for the automobile industry members
and their suppliers to change production facilities for millions of
vehicles and parts from one day to the next. Such efforts are ex-
pended in a continuous process extending over a reasonable time.
This kind of a normal transition period occurs whenever a safety
improvement is not externally prescribed by a clearly defined
safety standard. The normal, nonmandated safety improvement re-
sults from a continuous scientific, technological and economic de-
velopment and comes into being because the average consumer in
the market place requires and accepts it. The average consumer of
a 1978 car, for example, would undoubtedly reject a product that is
outdated in terms of its safety features, such as a 1978 automobile
with single circuit brakes only. However, the average consumer will
also reject a futuristic, sophisticated technical system, which may
offer some additional protection against more remote risks but for
a markedly higher price.
An illustration of the "market rejection" phenomenon might
be the "Anti-Skid Braking System" (ABS). This feature promotes
braking function as well as minimizing skidding when brakes are
applied. Currently, only a small market of affluent customers exists
for ABS, which may be found in certain high-priced vehicles. How-
ever, this relatively small consuming market has a kind of pioneer-
ing function in the development process for it permits commence-
ment of a more general technological advance. We are probably
witnessing the genesis of a new transition period in which the fu-
ture result may be that current braking systems without ABS fea-
tures will be outdated in perhaps ten years.
The current state of the art quite often provides for a certain
flexible margin of development in which variations of the new fea-
ture may nonetheless retain essential characteristics of the old sys-
tem. For example, the safety function served by three-point seat
belts may also be accomplished by two-point belts if the latter are
augmented with an appropriate knee bar, as currently found on
some vehicles. In this situation two-point belts are not outdated by
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the three-point system but continue to remain within the state of
the art. Except in the case of technical solutions mandated by
standards, state of the art normally consists of several technical
possibilities to solve a problem as well as a flexible margin of per-
formance. Sometimes, newly designed products are associated with
known side effects under certain conditions of use.20 For example,
a product may be highly necessary or desirable but a certain cate-
gory of users will prove to have allergic reactions to it.2 1 If such
risks are known, an appropriate warning will be issued to minimize
the risk of injury or to give the consumer a choice in deciding to
accept the risk in order to gain the benefit of the product.2 2 In
some instances, however, it will be impossible at the time of devel-
opment or manufacture to exclude injuries entirely by taking pre-
cautions against a known danger.2' To illustrate, injuries from the
sharp edge of a knife cannot be excluded without altering the utilU-
20 Depending on the circumstances, there may be a duty to warn where the product
seller has actual knowledge of adverse reactions or dangers from research reports or when
constructive knowledge can be imputed on the basis of available scientific literature. This is
particularly true in the pharmaceutical industry. See Dalke v. Upjohn Co., 555 F.2d 245, 248
(9th Cir. 1977); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522, 528-29
(1974).
21 See Wade, supra note 3, at 845.
22 Arguably, liability may nevertheless accrue if the dangerous characteristic could fea-
sibly have been eliminated or where the inherent dangers of the product clearly outweigh its
utility. See UPLA § 106, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,722; RESTATEMNr (SEcOND) oF TORTS § 402A,
Comment j; L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at § 16A [4][f][ii]; Wade, supra note
3, at 842. The sufficiency of the warning actually given may also be considered, and in some
cases, adequate instructions must be provided in order to fulfill the duty to warn. See Mc-
Cully v. Fuller Brush Co., 68 Wash. 2d 675, 415 P.2d 7 (1966).
23 Comment k to section 402A of the Restatement of Torts discusses "unavoidably un-
safe products" and states in pertinent part:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are
quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.... Such
a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning,
is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous .... The seller of such prod-
ucts ... is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences...
merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful
and desirable product, attendant with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k (1965). The Comment k approach has
been followed by most courts. See, e.g., Dalke v. Upjohn Co., 555 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1977)
(tooth discoloration from tetracycline); Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377 (D.
Md. 1975), afl'd, 567 F.2d 269 (1976) (stroke allegedly from birth control pills); Coffer v.
Standard Brands, Inc., 30 N.C. App. 134, 226 S.E.2d 534 (1976) (shell in nuts); Moore v.
Underwood Memorial Hosp., 147 N.J. Super. 252, 371 A.2d 105 (1977) (serum hepatitis con-
tracted from blood supplied). But see Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 IML 2d
443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970), subsequently overruled by ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, §§ 181-84
(Supp. 1979).
DESIGN LIABILITY
tarian aspect of the product. 4 Another example is a medication
against cancer that causes known side effects. The risk has to be
accepted because of the overwhelming utility of the product.2 5 As
future scientific development occurs, however, the side effects may
be diminished or excluded.
A further category of product development is one where the
design is associated with an unknown and scientifically undetect-
able danger, hazard or side effect. This category is known as "de-
velopment risks."26 Identification of this consideration is most im-
portant in trying to gauge the appropriate standard of a
manufacturer's design liability.
To summarize, products in actual use which have caused in-
jury because of some design characteristic may fall into one of five
categories: (1) "traditional design" produced when that concept
was the exclusive technical solution, even though possible new de-
signs were being planned or discussed in scientific literature; (2)
"traditional design" produced during the transition period when
some models of some manufacturers had abandoned the traditional
design in favor of an advanced design; (3) "traditional design" pro-
duced after the expiration of a reasonable transition period; (4) de-
signs (whether "traditional" or "advanced") having known but un-
avoidable dangers or side effects which are nevertheless acceptable
because of the utility of the product even with the risk; and (5)
designs whose side effects or dangers were unknown and scientifi-
24 It also should be noted that the Comment k duty to warn does not exist where the
product's dangers are a matter of common knowledge (liquor or cigarettes, for example) or
where the danger is perfectly apparent to the user. E.g., Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d
1176 (5th Cir. 1971) (meat grinder); Garrett v. Nissen Corp., 84 N.M. 16, 498 P.2d 1359
(1972) (trampoline); see Wade, supra note 3, at 842.
25 Examples of high risk products which have been exempted from strict liability treat-
ment because of their benefit to society are certain drugs, see Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
416 F.2d 417, 425-26 (2d Cir. 1969), and blood, see Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763,
765, 527 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 111, 529 P.2d 1232 (1974).
Although the Comment k exemption, see note 23 supra, is typically used for medical
products, there are indications that courts may extend the exception to other products as
well. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1091 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (asbestos); Wade, supra note 3, at 844.
2 In contrast to the situation where the product seller knew or had reason to know of
the product's dangers or where he expressly warranted the product's safety, courts have
indicated that no such duty exists when the risk was unknowable in light of the scientific
and technological knowledge available at the time of manufacture. See Love v. Wolf, 226
Cal. App. 2d 378, .38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964); Cochran v. Brooke, 243 Or. 89, 409 P.2d 904,
(1966); UPLA, Analysis § 106, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,727-28 (1979); Owles, What Does Develop-
ment Risk Really Mean? How It Differs From the State of the Art, [1980] PROD. LiAB. INT'L
199-200.
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cally undetectable at the time of manufacture, so-called "develop-
ment risks."
DESIGN LIABILITY UNDER EXISTING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
In spite of some statements by several courts and the urgings
of some commentators, strict liability in the area of product design
has generally continued to weigh the "reasonableness" of the man-
ufacturer's design choice or behavior .27 Thus, under present law in
many jurisdictions, manufacturers should only be held liable where
the injury was caused by a design characteristic that was outdated
when the product was put into circulation (category 3 above).28
This follows directly from the general product liability principle
that the claimant must prove that the product was defective at the
time it was put into circulation.29 Under this principle, proof of
responsible and careful design behavior continues to be involved in
strict liability actions either as a part of the plaintiff's prima facie
case"e in the form of an alleged absence of care, or as a valid topic
217 See notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text supra.
" Significantly, in duty to warn, as in design defect cases, United States courts have
continued to apply negligence principles, even after the adoption of strict liability. See
UPLA § 107, Analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62, 729-30; L. FRUMFR & M. FRIMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 8.01 (1980); Note, Standards of Product Seller Responsibility Under the Prod-
uct Liability Act, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 119, 126 (1980).
20 A products liability claimant must prove: (1) that a defect exists; (2) that the defect
was present at the time the product was put into circulation; and (3) that the defect proxi-
mately caused the damage. 1 R. HURSH, AmnmcAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LiAnarry § 1:2 (1961).
See also Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 98-99, 133 N.W.2d 129, 135
(1965). It has been pointed out that, since an adverse judgment in effect holds that an entire
product line is defective, traditional tort law principles should be retained in the area of
design defects by placing the burden of proof on the claimant. See Kalven, Torts: The
Quest for Appropriate Standards, 53 CALIF. L. Rav. 189, 202 (1965). But cf. Barker v. Lull
Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978) (overall
burden of proof remains on plaintiff, but defendant has to prove advantages outweigh risks)
note 16 supra; accord, Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885-86 (Alaska 1979).
" For a discussion of state of the art evidence in products liability cases, see Phillips,
The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Product Liability, 46 U. CiN. L. Rav. 101
(1977); Weinberger, The State of the Art and Products Liability, 28 DEFENSE L.J. 303
(1979); Comment, The State of the Art Defense in Products Liability: "Unreasonably Dan-
gerous" to the Injured Consumer, 18 DuQ. L. REv. 915 (1980). State of the art evidence has
been recognized as essential in some jurisdictions as part of the claimant's prima facie case
on the issue of design defect. See Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976); Baker v.
Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745 (Ct. App. 1976); Owens v. Allis-
Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App. 74, 268 N.W.2d 291 (1978); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978). In Owens, the court stated that in order for the case to be
submitted to the jury, the following factors must be presented by the plaintiff:
(1) That the particular design was not in conformity with industry design
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for the defense .3  The various design defect tests applied by a ma-
jority of courts often require the consideration of factors such as
available scientific knowledge, technical feasibility and economic
practicality.32 The degree of objectivity and the qualitative depth
of the inquiry in actual practice, however, varies, depending upon
the court's particular test for design defect. In some jurisdictions,
liability may be expanded into categories 1 and 2 above. It is
worthwhile to identify some of the major tests in order to discern
the influence of state of the art factors.33
standards, design guidelines established by an authoritative voluntary association,
or design criteria set by legislative or other governmental regulation; or
(2) That the design choice of the manufacturer carries with it a latent risk of
injury and the manufacturer has not adequately communicated the nature of that
risk to potential users of the product.
83 Mich. App. at 81, 268 N.W.2d at 294-95. See also Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259,
266 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976); Spurlin v. General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d
612, 615 (5th Cir. 1976); Vroman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 387 F.2d 732, 737 (6th Cir. 1967);
George v. Morgan Constr. Co., 389 F. Supp. 253, 262-64 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Olson v. Arctic
Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761, 765 (D.N.D. 1972); Lewis v. Bucyrus-Erie, Inc., [1980]
PROD. L B. REP. (CCH) 1 8784; Kerns v. Engelke, [1978-1979] PROD. LB. REP. (CCH)
8068.
31 In cases where state of the art evidence is not used by plaintiffs in establishing defec-
tiveness, some states permit the use of state of the art evidence as an absolute defense, e.g.,
Aniz. REv. STAT. §§ 12-683(1) (Supp. 1980); IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, §§ 4-20 A4(b)(4) (Bums.
Supp. 1980). In some jurisdictions, however, compliance with state of the art standards
merely establishes a rebuttable presumption of nonliability. See Turner v. Manning, Max-
well & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 217 S.E.2d 863, 868 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-403
(1)(a) (Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (1977). See also H.B. 188, N.J. Legis.,
1980 Sess. § 7(2) (1980); H.B. 993, N.C. Legis., 1979 Sess. § 99B-7(d) (1979); H.B. 373, Tex.
Legis., 1979 Sess. § 1 (1979). Even under the Barker approach, see note 9 supra, risk/utility
balancing will be most relevant, although the burden is shifted to the defendant.
32 Most courts agree that "a manufacturer is not obligated to adopt only those features
which represent the ultimate in safety or design," Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan.
2, 484 P.2d 47, 61 (1971); see Marker v. Universal Oil Products Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir.
1957), nor must he design the safest possible product. Weakley v. Fischback & Moore, Inc.,
515 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th Cir. 1975); see Raleigh, supra note 17, at 264-65. Even in jurisdic-
tions where knowledge of the defect is said to be imputed to a manufacturer, in most cases
the standard that will be applied is the state of the art existing at the time of manufacture:
"There is scant evidence, then, from which to conclude that courts are, in effect, evaluating
products on the basis of what alternative designs are feasible or what risks were knowable,
at the time of trial rather than at the time of marketing." U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., INTER-
AGENcy TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LABiIrrY 110 (1976) (Vol. IV of the Report of the Legal
Study); see D. OwLEs, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCT LiAEiLrrY iN THE UNrrED STATES 19-20
(1978). But cf. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 172, 386 A.2d 816, 825 (1978);
Keeton, supra note 15, at 568 (knowledge of defect at time of trial imputed to the
manufacturer).
Apart from the varying degrees of objectivity with which state of the art evidence is
applied, there also has been the problem of defining what is meant by state of the art.
Depending on the viewpoint of the speaker, state of the art may mean the most advanced
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STATE OF THE ART AS AN ELEMENT IN ALL DESIGN DEFECT TESTS
The Reasonably Prudent Manufacturer Test
Many decisions have adopted the standard that a product de-
sign is defective only if a reasonably prudent manufacturer, being
fully aware of the risk, would not have put the product on the mar-
ket.3 4 The reasonable manufacturer test, unrealistically construed,
might permit a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case merely by
showing that the designers theoretically were capable of producing
a possibly safer alternative design.3 5 Several recent cases, however,
indicate that a more realistic application of the test will prevail.
Thus the courts view the determinative inquiry as being whether it
would have been practical, in terms of cost and product function-
conceptual possibility, or the custom of the industry. O'Connell, supra note 13, at 659; Ra-
leigh, supra note 17, at 259. Legislatively defined standards are a third alternative. See
Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d at 958; 122 CONG. REc. 13,346 (1976) (remarks of Sen.
Taft); Raleigh, supra note 18, at 259; Comment, The State of the Art Defense in Products
Liability: "Unreasonably Dangerous" to the Injured Consumer, 18 DuQ. L. REv. 915, 922
(1980). State of the art, as used in this article, refers to the technical and scientific knowl-
edge available to the manufacturer at the time of manufacture, to be applied, however, only
in light of a balance between practical safety and economic considerations. See Owles, supra
note 26, at 175. See generally Weinberger, The State of the Art and Products Liability, 28
DEFENSE L.J. 303 (1979); see also Raleigh, supra note 16, at 267.
3' See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 494, 525 P.2d 1033, 1037
(1974); Nichols v. Union Underwear, [1980] PROD. SAFETY & LIAR. REP. (BNA) 501 (Ky.);
Weems v. CBS Imports Corp., [1980] 2 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 8781 (Or.). In Nichols, the
Kentucky Supreme Court noted that for design defect cases "the inquiry is to be made from
the perspective of a product manufacturer of similar products fully apprised of the condi-
tion and tendencies of the product when put into the stream of commerce." The Wade-
Keeton test of the reasonably prudent manufacturer differs from a negligence test in that it
imputes knowledge of the product's danger to the manufacturer. Wade, supra note 3, at
839-40 (imputes knowledge at the time of manufacture); Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability:
The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRAcus. L. Rv.
559, 568 (1969) (imputes scienter at time of trial). Moreover, unlike a negligence action,
where the determination of due care is a matter for the jury, the court, applying the reason-
ably prudent manufacturer test, should undertake an initial consideration of risk-utility fac-
tors before submitting the case to the jury. Wade, supra note 3, at 838. Dean Wade has
pointed out the reasons that make an initial weighing by the judge necessary in design cases:
[W]hen it is not just the single article which is to be classed as unsafe because
something went wrong in the making of it, but a whole group or class or type...
may be unsafe because of the nature of the design .... [P]olicy issues become
very important and the factors which were enumerated above must be collected
and carefully weighed. It is here that the court-whether trial or appellate-does
consider these issues in deciding whether to submit the case to the jury.
Id. See also 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,723.
35 Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 627-28. See also 141 South Main, Inc. v. Magic Fingers,
Inc., 49 Ill. App. 3d 724, 728, 364 N.E.2d 605, 608 (1977) (questioning whether feasibility of
safer alternative design was an essential element of plaintiff's prima facie case).
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ability, to adopt the alternative design.38 Wilson v. Piper Aircraft
Corp.,3 7 for example, involved a fatal airplane crash allegedly
caused by engine failure due to carburetor icing. In support of
their assertion that the aircraft's design was dangerously defective,
the plaintiffs had offered evidence that at the time of the plane's
manufacture fuel-injected engines were available which were less
susceptible to icing than carbureted engines.3 8 Reversing a sub-
stantial jury award for the plaintiffs, the Oregon Supreme Court
held that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs had not produced suffi-
cient evidence of design defect to establish a prima facie case.39 In
fields such as aeronautic design, where a jury's common knowledge
is limited, the court held it necessary for plaintiff to offer more
than mere evidence of technical possibility;40 the effect of such a
design change on the "cost, economy of operation, maintenance re-
quirements, overall performance, or safety in respects other than
susceptibility to icing" must also be presented.4 1 Similarly, in
Hagans v. Oliver Machinery Co.,42 the plaintiff alleged that a re-
movable safety device on an industrial saw was a defective design
feature because a permanently attached guard was available at the
time of manufacture. 43 Holding that the district court should have
granted a directed verdict for the defendant, the Fifth Circuit em-
36 See Lewis v. Bucyrus-Erie, Inc., [1980] 2 PROD. LAB. RE'. (CCH) 118784; Dreisonstok
v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1072-73 (4th Cir. 1974); Garst v. General Motors
Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47, 61 (1971); Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 91 Wash. 2d
345, 588 P.2d 1346 (1979). For a discussion of recent cases and the rationale for determining
the practicality of alternative designs, see Billheimer, Seller's Liability for Defective De-
sign-The Measure of Responsibility, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 237, 242 (1980); Lorenz, Die
Haftung des Produzenten far "Design Defects" in den U.S.A.: (1980) RIW/AWD 609; Ra-
leigh, supra note 15, at 254-55; Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product
Liability Law-A Push to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. Rv. 221, 229 (1979). Olson v. Arctic
Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972), illustrates the concern for practical con-
siderations in design cases. In Olson, the plaintiff argued that if the defendant had used
rubber, instead of metal tracks, his injuries would have been prevented or reduced. The
court found that the alternative design was not feasible because at the time of manufacture,
the industry had not yet developed a type of rubber that could withstand cold and stress
without being subject to premature failure. Id. at 765.
282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978) (en banc).
577 P.2d at 1324.
Id. at 1325. The court also rejected the defendant's assertion that compliance with
FAA standards should mandate dismissal of the suit, since the FAA design standards are
intended to be minimum standards only. Id. at 1324-25; see 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(1) (1976).
40 577 P.2d at 1327.
41 Id.
42 576 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1978).
43 Id. at 100.
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phasized the necessity of considering the effect of proposed design
changes on the product's functionability: "The evidence is over-
whelming that permanent attachment of the blade guard assembly
would seriously impair the usefulness of the defendant's product.
Texas law does not require a manufacturer to destroy the utility of
his product in order to make it safe."""
In jurisdictions that have adopted the reasonably prudent
manufacturer test, knowledge of the product's defect is imputed to
the manufacturer.4 5 There is some danger here, from an eviden-
tiary standpoint, that a kind of hindsight inquiry would be made
which tampers with the principle that a manufacturer's responsi-
bility ought to be judged at the time the product was made. In
other words, if the question is whether a reasonably prudent man-
ufacturer would not have marketed the product had he earlier
been aware of the risk, evidence of later developments, such as al-
ternate designs unavailable at the time of manufacture, might be
used to identify the risk which is imputed to the maker's knowl-
edge.46 However, such later developments may have been impracti-
cal, overly costly or unknown at the time the product was con-
ceived. In effect, the manufacturer might be judged not by the real
state of the art at the time of manufacture but by a hindsight ap-
plication of a development that was only futuristic at the critical
period. For example, in the period where single circuit brakes were
normally available, a dual circuit system may not have been ready
for production purposes. Yet, in a case brought ten years later in-
volving alleged failure of the older design, imputing backwards to
the manufacturer mere knowledge of the risk of not having dual
11 Id. at 101. The court emphasized that a manufacturer must balance safety concerns
"with the realities of a competitive market place." Id. If the defendant had manufactured
the saw with a permanently attached blade guard, the product would not have been useful
for many functions that could be accomplished on saws produced by competitors. Id.
45 See note 34 supra.
11 A recent topic of heated debate has been the admissibility of evidence of post-manu-
facture design change in products cases to prove "defect." See Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52
N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981); Warner v. Upjohn, [1980] PROD.
SAFETY & LIAB. Rep. (BNA) 628; Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528
P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975); Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 91, 258
N.W.2d 680 (1977); UPLA § 107, Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,729-30. Commen-
tators are divided over the fairness of holding manufacturers liable for dangerous character-
istics that were unknowable at the time of manufacture. Compare Birnbaum, supra note 1,
at 627, 648 with Twerski, Corporations Face Dilemma in Rulings on Design v. Manufactur-
ing Defects, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 2, 1981, at 6, col. 2. It is apparent that a hindsight analysis may
effectively eliminate defenses based upon state of the art factors and, therefore, is a further
step in the direction of absolute liability.
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circuit brakes might introduce to the jury a "false" state of the art
factor. Because of this danger, as well as others, the legal standard
for determining "defectiveness" is critical. Therefore, it appears vi-
tal under this test that mere evidence of possible alternative de-
signs be deemed insufficient unless there is also a qualitative con-
sideration of the practicality and feasibility of those alternatives. 7
One may logically conclude that, if design liability is not to become
absolute and the jury is to properly consider real state of the art
factors at the time of manufacture, the plaintiff must be required
to demonstrate the prior practicality and feasibility of his pro-
posed design alternative.
The Consumer Expectations Test
Some courts measure liability for design defect by using the
safety expectations of ordinary consumers as an appropriate legal
yardstick, either alone48 or in combination with a risk/utility bal-
ancing.49 Under this analysis, which is based upon the famous sec-
47 The majority view regards state of the art evidence as relevant in establishing the
extent of the manufacturer's duty in the area of product design. O'Donnell, Design Litiga-
tion and the State of the Art: Terminology, Practice and Reform, 11 AKRON L. REV. 627,
646 (1978). Since the practical implications for a manufacturer when a design is held to be
defective are considerable, the evidence to support the claim should be substantial. Plain-
tiffs should not be able to prove their allegations by mere verbal statements. See, e.g.,
Blohm v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 380 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1967); Self v. General Motors Corp., 42
Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rtpr. 575 (1974). Nevertheless, courts have been criticized for ap-
plying lax evidentiary standards, which unduly benefit claimants in products liability cases,
see O'Donnell, supra, at 646, and for permitting plaintiff's technological experts to focus
upon a narrow factor such as the availability of an alternative design. Donaher, Piehier,
Twerski, Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products Liability Litigation, 52 TEx. L.
REV. 1303, 1311-12 (1974). Indeed, some courts have allowed cases to be submitted to the
jury on the assumption that the expert's testimony is sufficient to create an issue of fact
regardless of what the expert may have conceded during his testimony. See, e.g., Melia v.
Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976); Spurling v. General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d
612 (5th Cir. 1976); Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974); Self v. General
Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974). Since there may be a tendency of
juries to apply post-accident hindsight to the facts, the court should "apply its screening
function carefully." 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,723; see Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich.
App. 74, 268 N.W.2d 291 (1978); Wade, supra note 3, at 837-38.
411E.g., Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640, 105 Cal Rptr. 890, 895
(1973); Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 840-41 (Iowa 1978); Meyers v.
Meyers, 81 Wash. 2d 533, 503 P.2d 59 (1972). Cf. Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Serv.,
624 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1980) (custom as indicative of ordinary consumer expectations).
" Because of the fear that manufacturers might escape without liability for faulty de-
signs where consumer expectations fall below the state of the art, some courts use consumer
expectations as a threshold standard, with risk/utility balancing available as an alternative
test. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co.,
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tion 402A of the Restatement of Torts, state of the art evidence is
relevant on the issue of whether the product is "dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics. '50 A car with dual cir-
cuit brakes, for example, made when dual circuit brakes were sim-
ply not practicable or feasible to introduce into series production,
could not have been expected to be possessed by the ordinary con-
sumer. If design guilt were imposed under such circumstances the
test would be imposing an absolute liability which no court cur-
rently sanctions.51 Logically, an ordinary consumer cannot expect
more safety than was technically and economically feasible at the
time when the product was marketed. Thus, for example, in Bruce
v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,52 the court held that plaintiffs could not
prove that the reasonable consumer "would expect a plane made in
1952 to have the safety features of one made in 1970. '153
Consumer expectations should never induce courts to exact a
higher standard from designers and engineers than is possible
within the state of the art. Nevertheless, although the consumer
expectations test is phrased in objective terms, it is questionable
whether objectivity is achieved in practice.5' Arguably, the test
20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). Several courts fuse consumer expec-
tations and risk/utility balancing into a single test. See, e.g., Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg.
Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 835-36 (Iowa 1978); Estate of Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 91
Wash. 2d 111, 118, 587 P.2d 160, 164 (1978); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d
145, 154, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (1975). One commentator suggests that employing this approach
in product design cases combines conceptually dissimilar standards, thereby inviting "error
and confusion." Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 617.
50 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i (1965).
81 Even where courts apply the Barker test, there probably would not be liability under
these circumstances. See note 10 supra.
52 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976). In Bruce, passengers and relatives of deceased passen-
gers who were injured or killed in an airplane crash instituted suit against the manufacturer
of the airplane and an intermediate seller. Id. at 444. The plaintiffs alleged that the defen-
dants failed to design or maintain the plane in crashworthy condition-specifically they al-
leged inadequate seat fastenings and lack of protection against fire. Id. The Tenth Circuit,
in affirming summary judgment for the defendants, declared that the plaintiffs' affidavit in
which it was stated that "18 years after the manufacture and sale of the plane safer passen-
ger seats were in use" in the industry was irrelevant for determining liability. Id. at 447.
I !d.
The drafters of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act have stated that "Itihe
consumer expectations test takes subjectivity to its most extreme end. Each trier of fact is
likely to have a different understanding of abstract consumer expectations. Moreover, most
consumers are not familiar with the details of the manufacturing process and cannot ab-
stractly evaluate conscious design alternatives." 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,724. Dean Wade, supra
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raises the possibility of arbitrary and inconsistent verdicts because
of the likelihood that jurors, without instruction as to the proper
significance of state of the art factors, may apply hindsight to eval-
uate what consumer expectations might have been at the time of
the injury. s5
Risk/Utility Balancing
One test used by some courts is a weighing of so-called "risk/
utility factors. ' 51s The inquiry, in effect, is whether the utilitarian
features or advantages of a particular design outweigh the dangers
inherent in that design. In risk/utility weighing, the outcome may
depend upon the importance attributed to the weighing factors.
While the basic concept is accepted that the dangerous characteris-
note 3, at 829, also has questioned the suitability of the consumer expectations test for
design defect cases: "In many situations, particularly involving design matters, the con-
sumer would not know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product
could be made." Id. See also Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex.
1979); Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54
TEx. L. REV. 1185 (1976). To compound the problem, it is not always clear whether the
consumer's expectations are to be determined objectively by reference to community knowl-
edge, or subjectively, by referring to the specialized knowledge of the consumer who sus-
tained the injury. See Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 471-72, 242 S.E.2d 671, 680
(1978) (subjective standard); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co.,
69 Wisc. 2d 326, 332, 230 N.W.2d 794, 798-99 (1975) (objective standard). See also UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-15-6 (2) (1977) (implies use of subjective standard).
One commentator has described thi "haphazard subjectivity" which is inherently a part
of the consumer expectations test:
When the defect is latent and the product complicated in design (as most prod-
ucts now seem to be), it cannot be said with any certainty that consumers know
what to expect because they usually do not know how safely the product could or
should have been made. If this proposition is true, . . . [h]ow, then, can jurors
charged under a consumer expectations test make a determination of whether to
impose liability? In all probability, they guess.
Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 614 (footnote omitted). See also Montgomery & Owen, Reflec-
tions on the Theory and Administration of Strict Liability for Defective Products, 27
S.C.L. REv. 803, 823 (1976).
Il Different juries are free to evaluate consumer expectations on a case-by-case basis,
each applying its own interpretation of what dangers would have been contemplated by
consumers. Inconsistent verdicts regarding the same product design obviously can result.
Compare, e.g., Nichols v. Union Underwear, [1980] PROD. SA rY & LLB. REP. (BNA) 501,
503 (Ky.) with Weems v. CBS Imports Corp., [1980] 2 PROD. LiAR. REP. (CCH) 118781 (Or.).
M Dean Wade suggests the following risk/utility factors: the usefulness of the product;
the likelihood it will cause harm; the availability of alternative designs; the ability of the
manufacturer to eliminate the dangerous aspect of the product without damaging its utility,
the ability of the user to prevent harm by exercising due care; the user's knowledge of the
inherent dangers and the ability of the manufacturer to spread the loss by increasing the
price.
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tics of a product design must be balanced against its utility, the
list of possible weighing factors differs among jurisdictions. 7 Thus,
while juries in California"8 and Alaska 59 may be instructed to con-
sider whether a proposed safer design might be unreasonably dan-
gerous under other conditions, New Jersey courts have been silent
regarding this point.60 The suggestion has also been made that it is
inappropriate for the trial judge to list specific factors to be consid-
ered when instructing the jury on risk/utility balancing. 1
The difficulty of employing the risk/utility test in a manner
which would provide objectivity and legal certainty to society is
illustrated by the case of Dawson v. Chrysler Corp.2 In Dawson,
the plaintiff's automobile slid off a rain-soaked highway and struck
a steel pole at a forty-five degree angle with such force that the
automobile "literally wrapped itself around the pole."63 The driver
was crushed when the pole ripped through the body of the vehicle,
pinning him between the seat and windshield.6 At trial, the plain-
tiff alleged that the vehicle's design was defective because the
frame did not have rigid structural reinforcements around the
front and rear doors.65 The defendant's experts established, in ad-
dition to compliance with federal safety standards, that the auto-
mobile involved was stronger than comparable vehicles of other
manufacturers, and that its frame design would be safer than the
alternative proposed by the plaintiff in most crashes.66 Neverthe-
Wade, supra note 3, at 837-38.
See Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 433-34, 573 P.2d 443, 457-58, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 239-40 (1978).
11 See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979).
80 See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978) (applying
Wade-Keeton factors); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140
(1979). In Suter, although risk/utility factors had been offered in evidence at trial, the judge
failed to instruct the jury as to their applicability to a finding of liability. See id. at 165, 406
A.2d at 147; Birnbaum, supra, note 1 at 626.
8 Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. 1979); Wade, supra note
3, at 840. Dean Wade compares the strict liability factors with the Restatement analysis of
negligence, in which risk-utility factors are identified. While these factors may be profitably
used by judges, students, and commentators, they ordinarily should not be referred to in the
instructions to the jury, unless one of the factors has special significance in light of the facts
of the case. Wade, supra note 3, at 840.
62 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1981).
83 Id. at 953-54.
Id. at 954.
65 Id.
86 Id. Chrysler's experts also testified that the design suggested by the plaintiff would
add approximately $300 more to the cost of the vehicle and would add 200 to 250 pounds to
the weight of the car. Id.
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less, the jury returned a verdict of over two million dollars, which
the Third Circuit reluctantly upheld, "with uneasiness regarding
the consequences of our decision and the decisions of other courts
throughout the country in cases of this kind."8'7 While the Dawson
jury, left with the task of weighing risk/utility factors, found that
Chrysler should have produced a more rigid frame, this finding
could conflict with a finding in another case that the same frame
design was too rigid. As the Third Circuit opinion observed:
In effect, this permits individual juries applying varying laws in
different jurisdictions to set nationwide automobile safety stan-
dards and to impose on automobile manufacturers conflicting re-
quirements. It would be difficult for members of the industry to
alter their design and production behavior in response to jury ver-
dicts in such cases, because their response might well be at vari-
ance with what some other jury decides is a defective design.
Under these circumstances, the law imposes on the industry the
responsibility of insuring vast numbers of persons involved in au-
tomobile accidents."
While it cannot be denied that compensation for victims of
product defects is a desirable social goal, the question becomes to
what extent we should be willing to punish responsible design be-
havior in an entire industry in favor of the goal of individual com-
pensation. A rationale of risk spreading, while arguably workable
in the context of a mechanical defect, goes too far when applied to
areas of design defects since the potential for liability appears to
be limitless."9 As has been pointed out by several commentators,
the determination of such complex policy issues may even be be-
yond the function or ability of the judicial system.70 It is neverthe-
less apparent that by submitting risk/utility factors to juries with-
out an initial weighing by the judge, United States courts, in effect,
permit the fact finder to redesign by hindsight entire product lines
according to the unique circumstances surrounding individual inju-
ries. The remarks of the Dawson court that the present arrange-
', Id. at 962.
Id. See generally Raleigh, supra note 18.
', See note 17 and accompanying text supra. The risk-spreading rationale as applied to
design defect cases "provides no stopping point short of absolute liability." 44 Fed. Reg. at
62,722 (1979). Since an entire product line is impugned in design cases, the implementation
of a predictable design standard based on fault would provide a better incentive to manu-
facturers to design safer products and supply some necessary stability in this area of prod-
ucts liability.
70 See note 5 supra.
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ment is not clearly "fair or efficient" 71 amounts to an attack on the
present form of design claim resolution. The court's statement ap-
pears to have been prompted by the inability of the risk/utility
weighing process to reach consistent and objective evaluations of
product designs and, further, by the possible adverse impact of a
case-by-case approach upon "other national social and economic
goals" such as the requirement to produce a car that is heavier
with less fuel efficiency, which might result from plaintiff Dawson's
proposed redesign. 2
Much of the problem appears to stem from the failure of
courts to accord definitive and proper weight to the industry's
state of the art at the time of manufacture as the basis for deter-
mining defect in a product's design.7 3 An approach which considers
the practical technological feasibility of allegedly safer alterna-
tiveS7 4 properly should be applied by the judge in the determina-
tion of whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. Since
many decisions hold a product design to be defective only if an
ordinarily prudent company would not have marketed the prod-
uct,75 state of the art is an important implied consideration. A
manufacturer would have been imprudent if his product was be-
hind the state of the art. As stated by one court, "the distinction
between so-called strict liability and negligence is of no practical
significance" in design claims, because "in either event the stan-
dard required is reasonable care. '76 The latter standard, at least
" 630 F.2d at 963.
" Id. at 962; see note 66 supra.
73 For a discussion of the role of state of the art evidence in product liability litigation,
see notes 30 & 31 supra.
" "State of the art" has received varying definitions, depending upon the viewpoint of
the speaker. Claimants in product liability actions typically argue that state of the art en-
compasses the most advanced conceptual possibility in product design, without regard to
practicality. Defendants, on the other hand, have urged that customary industry practice is
the proper state of the art standard. The definition of state of the art employed in this
Article falls between these two extremes, and considers both the feasibility and the practi-
cality of proposed safer alternative designs. See note 33 supra.
75 See note 34 supra.
" Nichols v. Union Underwear, 1980 PROD. SAFETY & LrkB. REP. (BNA) 501 (Ky.). The
Nichols court made the following enlightened statements with respect to design defects:
We think it apparent that when the claim asserted is against a manufacturer for
deficient design of its product the distinction between the so-called strict liability
principle and negligence is of no practical significance so far as the standard of
conduct required of the defendant is concerned. In either event the standard re-
quired is reasonable care. Thus, the fact finder in a design case must decide
whether the manufacturer that placed in commerce the product made according
to an intended design acted prudently.
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implicitly, involves consideration of the state of art. Thus, virtually
all the American design defect tests would involve looking into the
scientific knowledge, technical feasibility and economic practicality
of the design when manufactured. The problem, however, is that
the degree of objectivity and quality of this inquiry varies in actual
practice.
STATE OF THE ART INFLUENCES UPON "UNAVOIDABLY DANGEROUS"
PRODUCTS AND "DEvELoPmENT RisKs"
Two other design categories appear to naturally militate
against liability because of state of art influences. First, in the case
of "unavoidably dangerous" designs, liability is excluded for those
useful products known to be unavoidably dangerous but which
cannot be designed safer when made.7 Here state of the art at
time of manufacture precludes a safer design. Thus, if the neces-
sary warnings have been given, liability is excluded. Second, state
of the art influences are found in the category of so-called "devel-
opment risks" where liability is denied because the product was
associated with an unknown and scientifically undetectable dan-
ger at the time it was made. 8
The development risk category should reach the same result of
no liability regardless of which design test is employed.79 Develop-
Id.
'1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment kI
78 See Owles, What Does Development Risk Really Mean? How It Differs From the
State of the Art, 1980 PROD. LIA. INT'L 199-200. Owles, however, does not clearly distin-
guish between "unreasonably dangerous products," where a risk is known but no feasible
means exists to avoid it, and "development risk," where the risk is unknown and undetect-
able. In the United States, generally, this distinction is not clearly drawn, and development
risk situations appear to be discussed under the label of unavoidably dangerous products.
7 Regardless of the test applied by the court, state of the art considerations should
preclude design liability where the product's dangers are unknown and scientifically unde-
tectable at the time of production. Basic considerations of fairness dictate that liability
should not be found where no safer alternative was practicably feasible at the time the
product was marketed, see discussion of "Design Development Considerations and Time
Factors" supra. These considerations logically should compel the same result regardless of
whether the danger was "unavoidable" or "undetectable." In either case, the practical con-
straint upon the manufacturer is the same: he could not have acted more reasonably under
the circumstances. This conclusion is viable under the consumer expectations test because
nobody objectively can expect safer products than are scientifically feasible. Similarly, both
the reasonably prudent manufacturer standard and the risk/utility analysis should exclude
liability for development risk because the practical feasibility of a safer design must be con-
sidered in either test. If, however, this critical weighing factor were to be disregarded by the
judge in some cases, development risk liability could be the result.
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ment risk has been addressed perhaps more frequently by courts in
cases where the question raised was whether a manufacturer has a
duty to warn against the unknown. 0 One such case in Illinois in-
volved a suit commenced on behalf of a child who was born disfig-
ured due to an unknown side effect of a drug administered to the
mother during delivery." Plaintiff claimed strict liability for fail-
ure of the drug manufacturer to warn of the potential hazard. The
Illinois Supreme Court stated that liability "for failure to warn of a
danger which would be impossible to know based on the present
state of human knowledge would make the manufacturer the vir-
tual insurer of the product, a position rejected by this court."82
The Illinois court thereby joined the American mainstream of deci-
sions on development risk cases.8 3 Guiding the court's result was
its opinion that liability for failure to warn "should be based on
80 See note 20 supra.
Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 1980 PROD. SAFETY & LiAR. REP. (BNA) 205 (IML). In
Woodill, the suit was brought on behalf of a child who was born disfigured, allegedly be-
cause of an unknown side effect of a drug administered to the mother during delivery. The
complaint, based on strict liability, charged the drug manufacturer with failure to give ade-
quate warnings of the potential hazard. Id. The Illinois Supeme Court, without expressly
saying so, made it the basis of its decision that the unknown side effect made the drug not
defective as a matter of law. As stated by that court:
To hold the manufacturer liable for failure to warn of a danger which would be
impossible to know based on the present state of human knowledge would make
the manufacturer the virtual insurer of the product, a position rejected by this
court .... [W]here liability is framed by the manufacturer's duty to warn ade-
quately of dangers which may arise from the use of a drug, that liability should be
based on there being some manner in which to know of the danger.
Id. The Illinois Supeme Court thus made itself part of the mainstream of U.S. court deci-
sions, which predicate the manufacturer's duty to warn upon the foreseeability of the risk
and the seriousness of the potential harm. See note 83 infra.
82 Id. at 207.
The majority of American courts have refused to find that a duty to warn exists in
cases where the risk was not discoverable within existing scientific knowledge. UPLA § 106,
Analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,728, states:
With the exception of one Illinois decision, "Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial
Hosp.," 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970), subsequently overruled by "Ill. Ann.
Stat." ch. 91, Sections 181-84 (Supp. 1979), this approach has been followed by
the common law courts throughout the United States. See, e.g., "Moore v. Under-
wood Memorial Hosp.," 147 N.J. Super. 252, 371 A.2d 105 (1977) (serum hepatitis
contracted from blood supplied); "Dalke v. Upjohn Co.," 555 F.2d 245 (9th Cir.
1977) (tooth discoloration from tetracycline); "Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co.,"
441 F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1975) (stroke allegedly from birth control pills); "Coffer
v. Standard Brands, Inc.," 30 N.C. App. 134, 226 S.E.2d 534 (1976) (shell in nuts);
"Hines v. St. Joseph's Hospital," 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075 (1974) (blood
transfusion).
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there being some manner in which to know of the danger."'"
THE MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABIIrY ACT
In recognition of the "uncertainties in the tort litigation" sys-
tem, the Model Uniform Products Liability Act (UPLA) 85 rejects a
strict liability standard for design defect and failure to warn
cases.86 The cost of product injuries will be borne by the manufac-
turer only upon a showing of fault or blameworthiness. 87 Specifi-
cally rejecting the consumer expectations test on the ground that it
"takes subjectivity to its most extreme end," the UPLA adopts a
risk/utility standard for determining whether a design is "unrea-
sonably unsafe."88 Unlike the risk/utility tests employed by some
84 Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 1980 PRoD. SAFET & Lms. REP. (BNA) 205 (Ill.).
11 United States Dep't of Commerce, UPLA reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
86 Analysis of § 104, at 62,722. The drafters found that strict liability was appropriate
in only two types of product cases: manufacturing defect and breach of express warranty.
Unlike these areas, in which damages can be predicted and absorbed by the liability insur-
ance system, design defect and duty-to-warn involve uncertain standards which place entire
product lines in jeopardy. Id.
87 See 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,722. The drafters of the UPLA emphasize that-
Product liability law is a branch of the law of torts.... Tort law is not a compen-
sation system similar to Social Security or Worker Compensation. A product seller
should not, through the medium of tort law, be asked to pay merely because its
product caused an injury. If a social judgment is made that product sellers are to
bear the costs of all injuries caused by their products, it would be far more effi-
cient to make purchasers of products third-party beneficiaries of product sellers'
insurance policies as is the case with other compensation systems.... In con-
trast, product liability law, with its full tort law recovery, reflects the social judg-
ment that liability should be imposed only when it is fair to hold the individual
product seller responsible for the injury.
44 Fed. Reg. at 62,715.
"Id. at 62,721. The judge must make a preliminary determination of whether the
plaintiff introduced proof from which a jury reasonably could find, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the product was "unreasonably unsafe in design," UPLA § 104[2], or
"unreasonably unsafe because adequate warnings or instructions were not provided," UPLA
§ 104[3]. 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721. "The dangers of the trier of fact introducing hindsight into
the risk-utility analysis make it imperative for the court to apply its screening function
carefully." Analysis of § 104, id. at 62,723; see Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App.
74, 268 N.W.2d 291 (1978). The UPLA lists the following factors which the jury may utilize
in making an evaluation, once the initial weighing has been made by the judge:
(a) Any warnings and instructions provided with the product,
(b) The technological and practical feasibility of a product designed and manufac-
tured so as to have prevented claimant's harm while substantially serving the
likely user's expected needs;
(c) The effect of any proposed alternative design on the usefulness of the product;
(d) The comparative costs of producing, distributing, selling, using, and maintain-
ing the product as designed and as alternately designed; and
(e) The new or additional harms that might have resulted if the product had been
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courts, however, the UPLA standard definitively identifies the in-
fluence of state of the art by clearly providing for consideration of
the economic, scientific, and technological factors which contribute
to any product design.89 Thus, under the UPLA's balancing, the
claimant must prove that the risk and the seriousness of the poten-
tial injury outweighed both the manufacturer's burden in designing
a product that would not have caused the injury, and the adverse
effect that proposed alternatives would have had on the product's
utility.90 Conversely, if the manufacturer's proof shows that it was
not within practical technological feasibility to incorporate a safer
design or provide warnings or instructions that would have pre-
vented the harm, there will be no liability for design defect or fail-
ure to warn.9 1 Significantly, the UPLA requires the judge to make
the initial determination as to whether the plaintiff has introduced
sufficient evidence for the case to reach the jury.2 Moreover, only
the knowledge that "was reasonably feasible for use in light of eco-
nomic practicality at the time of manufacture" can be consid-
ered.9 3 Because a qualitative state of the art inquiry is clearly man-
so alternatively designed.
44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
81 One factor which the jury may consider is state of the art evidence. 44 Fed. Reg. at
62,723. In design cases, such evidence includes: the technological and practical feasibility of
producing a product which would have "prevented [the] claimant's harm while substantially
serving the likely user's expected needs;" the effect of the alternative design on the prod-
uct's usefulness; "costs of producing, distributing, selling, using, and maintaining the prod-
uct" as compared to allegedly safer designs; and the harms which might have occurred had
the alternative design been produced. § 104[B][2][b] to [e], 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721. Proba-
tive state of the art evidence in duty-to-warn cases includes: the ability of the manufacturer
to recognize the product's danger and the "technological and practical feasibility" of giving
a warning. Id. § 104 [c][2][a] & [c]. In short, the claimant bears the burden of proving that
"in light of a balance of practical, objective factors," the manufacturer should bear the cost
of the injury. UPLA § 104, Analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,724.
90 UPLA § 104, Analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,724.
91 See note 89 supra. The UPLA definition of "practical technological feasibility" un-
dertakes to resolve the controversy between consumer groups and product sellers over the
role of state of the art in defining product "defect." UPLA § 107, Analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at
62,729. Feasibility would require more than mere compliance with industry custom, thus
alleviating the fear that manufacturers might be absolved of liability if the entire industry
lagged behind in development. Id. at 62,730. Determining "feasibility," however, would also
require the consideration of economic concerns "such as the ability of a product seller to
price a product so that it is competitive.. . ." Id. The UPLA further provides that compli-
ance with state of the art standards formulated by a legislative or administrative body
would preclude a finding of design defect unless the claimant proves "that a reasonably
prudent product seller would and could have taken additional precautions." Id. at 62,730-31.
" See note 88 supra.
93 UPLA § 106, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,727. This emphasis on practicality at the time of
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dated, the UPLA provisions for design defect and failure to warn
provide a more practical, objective standard which will permit
manufacturers to anticipate the risk of liability for design defect,
and thus serve as an incentive for responsible design behavior." It
remains to be seen whether the states will uniformly adopt this
approach, which nevertheless seems to offer the prospect of stabil-
ity as an alternative to the shifting and contradictory standards
currently existing under American case law. Even if the states do
not adopt the UPLA, their courts can nevertheless adopt the
UPLA approach to requiring state of art evaluation via evolution
of the common law. If the importance of state of the art is openly
and properly recognized, as opposed to a mere implicit recognition,
the various existing design tests described earlier will be much
improved.
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S APPROACH
The articulation of common law design liability in the United
States may be compared with the parallel effort being attempted
in the European community 5 through a so-called "Draft Direc-
manufacture carries over into the drafters' interpretation of the phrase "incapable of being
made safe," which applies "when the danger cannot be avoided without seriously impairing
the product's usefulness." Id. Section 106 follows the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 402A, Comment k (1965); see note 20 supra. Under section 104[c], additionally, the jury
would be charged "to place itself in the manufacturer's position at the time the product was
manufactured .... [T]he duty to provide adequate warnings and instructions cannot go
beyond the technological and other information that was reasonably available at the time of
manufacture." 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,724. This view is in accord with a majority of United
States courts. See Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir.
1977).
9 UPLA § 106, Analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,727-28. The drafters suggest that sound
policy dictates that products liability law should encourage research and development by
manufacturers "without unleashing unreasonably unsafe products on the public." Id. at
62,728.
95 In recent years, several European organizations have attempted to coordinate inter-
national developments in products liability law. In 1972, the Hague Conference on Private
International Law adopted a convention on the issue of conflict of laws in product liability
cases. Conference de La Haye de droit international priv6, Artes et documents de la
douzi~me session 2 au 21 octobre 1972, Tome III, Responsabilit6 du fait des produits, Acte
final 246-50 (1974); see Reese, Further Comments on the Hague Convention on the Law
Applicable to Products Liability, 8 GA. J. INT'L Comp. L. 311 (1978). Other European orga-
nizations have proposed measures to harmonize the substantive laws of their member na-
tions in the area of products liability. In 1970, the Council of Europe, see 87 U.N.T.S. 103
(1951), formed a committee to prepare a draft to unify existing products liability law. It was
completed in 1977. European Convention on Products Liability in Regard to Personal In-
jury and Death, [1977] Europ. T.S. 91, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 7 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as European Convention]. It should be noted that the European Convention is
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tive" proposed by the Commission of the European Communi-
ties."6 In the European proposal a strict liability or "liability irre-
spective of fault" is being urged, but it is one in which state of the
art factors, for example, are not being fully recognized or applied.
There are major deficiencies in the Directive's provision of liability
for development risks, in its definition of design defect, in its reli-
ance on risk distribution as a rationale for design liability and in
its failure to gear liability to the state of the art prevailing at the
time of production. These deficiencies are of significance not only
to European manufacturers but also to American producers who
export their products to Europe. For example, an American manu-
facturer might be haled into a European court and saddled with a
strict liability without fault for a design development risk un-
known and undetectable to it at the time of manufacture. It is,
therefore, desirable to briefly review the Directive's problem areas
with a view to remedying them.
The Proposed Draft Directive
Apparently disregarding the American experience in struggling
to articulate a strict liability for design and failure to warn, the
European Commission proposes a strict liability across-the-board,
without distinction between design and manufacturing defect
claims, and even includes liability for development risks.9" The
not meant to supplant the existing national legal systems in Member countries, but n4erely
gives plaintiffs a supplementary right of action. European Convention, art. 12. But cf. 39
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 263, 265-66 (1980) (article 10 of the Convention prohibits ratifying states
from adopting rules derogating from the Convention even if the rules are more favorable to
plaintiffs). In addition to the Council of Europe, the European Economic Community
(E.E.C.), see 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1957), has proposed a directive similar to the European Con-
vention on liability for defective products. See note 96 infra.
" Proposal for a Council Directive relating to the approximation of the laws, regula-
tions, and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defec-
tive products, 19 O.J. EUR. Comm. (no. C271) 3-4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as E.E.C. Direc-
tive]. An earlier version, published in 1976, is reprinted in Orban, Product Liability: A
Comparative Legal Restatement-Foreign National Law and the EEC Directive, 8 GA. J.
INT'L & Comp. L. 342, 396-406 (1978). This Article focuses on the E.E.C. Directive. For a
discussion of the similarities and differences between the E.E.C. Directives and the Euro-
pean Convention, see H. TEBBENS, INTERNATIONAL PRODuCT LiAnIrry 143-61 (1979). Unlike
the European Convention, the E.E.C. Directive is not a voluntary standard, but derives
from the "mandatory supranational authority of the EEC" to harmonize the laws of its
member states. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
Preamble, cl. 1, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 14; Orban, supra, at 374.
w See E.E.C. Directive, supra note 96, art. 1(2), 4. In contrast, the majority of jurisdic-
tions in the United States have not extended liability to development risks and have limited
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Commission's reasons for its approach are stated in certain
"whereas" clauses in the proposed Directive:98
[A]n equal and adequate protection of the consumer can be
achieved only through the introduction of liability irrespective of
fault on the part of the producers of the article which was defec-
tive and caused the damage ....
[L]iability on the part of the producer irrespective of fault en-
sures an appropriate solution to this problem in an age of increas-
ing technicality, because he can include the expenditure which he
incurs to cover this liability in his production costs when calculat-
ing the price and therefore divide it among all consumers of prod-
ucts which are of the same type but free from defects ....
[L]iability cannot be excluded for those products which at the
time when the producer put them into circulation could not have
been regarded as defective according to the state of science and
technology ("development risks"), since otherwise the consumer
would be subjected without protection to the risk that the defec-
tiveness of a product is discovered only during use.
[To protect the person and property of the consumer, it is neces-
sary, in determining the defectiveness of a product, to concen-
trate not on the fact that it is unfit for use but on the fact that it
is unsafe; whereas this can only be a question of safety which ob-
jectively one is entitled to expect.
[Since products age in the course of time, higher safety stan-
dards are developed and the state of science and technology pro-
gresses, it would be unreasonable to make the producer liable for
an unlimited period for the defectiveness of his products .... 99
It appears from the foregoing rationales that the Commission pro-
posal has mistakenly understated the positive influence that fault
principles play in achieving safer products,100 overemphasized risk
liability for design defects to those products whose safety features have not complied with
the state of the art existing at the time of production. See note 26 and accompanying text
supra; see also H. TEBENS, INTERNATIONAL PRODuCrs LIAiLrry 147-48, 161. Under the pro-
posed Directive, however, liability for development risks exists "even if the article could not
have been regarded as defective in the light of the scientific and technological development
at the time when.., put ... into circulation." E.E.C. Directive, supra note 96, art. 1 (2).
*' E.E.C. Directive, supra note 96, Preamble.
9Id.
100 American case law demonstrates that negligence factors cannot be excluded in de-
sign defect and duty to warn cases. See note 9 supra; see also 47 Deutscher Juristentag in
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2045, 2047 (1968) (the influential Deutsche Juristentag op-
posed the introduction of strict liability for development risks and was divided on the issue
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spreading as applied to design cases,101 over-reacted by imposing
liability for "development risks, '102 and omitted a true considera-
tion of "state of the art" criteria.103
A Consideration of Risk Spreading and Fault Principles in
Design Defect Litigation
The rationales suffer from a fundamental deficiency. The ma-
jor goal stated in the "whereas" clauses is to achieve improved con-
sumer protection by stressing the needs for safety and enlarging
the consumer's ability to sue for damages.' While consumer pro-
of strict liability as applied to manufacturing and design defects). It is significant that the
UPLA has also rejected the imposition of strict liability in these areas. See 44 Fed. Reg. at
62,722.
101 Risk spreading is only one factor to be considered among the complex social policy
issues surrounding product liability. To the extent that risk-spreading theory inhibits design
innovation, it must be viewed with caution. The introduction of strict liability as proposed
in the Directive may prove to be detrimental to consumers by causing an increase in costs
for damage compensation without affording victims of product related injuries better
financial protection, von Hillsen, The Status of Product Liability de lege lata and de lege
ferenda in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Europe as seen by Industry, in PROD-
uCr LABLrrY IN AIR AND SPACE TRANSPORTATION 41 (K.H. B6ckstiegel ed. 1978). It also may
lead to a fatalistic approach on the part of manufacturers in designing new products and
provide less incentive to manufacturers to improve product design. Id.
102 Article 1 of the proposed Directive includes development risks within the imposition
of strict liability. Proposed E.E.C. Directive, supra note 96, art. 1(2). The E.E.C. Memoran-
dum states:
If these extremely rare cases of damages [development risks] were to be excluded
from the producer's liability, the consumer would have to bear the risk of un-
known defects. Here also only the principle of liability irrespective of fault can
lead to a universally acceptable solution ....
E.E.C. Memorandum, para. 2 (1976).
103 See notes 119-127 and accompanying text infra.
104 The proposed Directive's preamble sets forth three main reasons for the need to
unify the laws of Member States on products liability, one, to avoid unfair competition
among producers in member countries resulting from differences in severity of product lia-
bility laws; two, to protect the free movement of goods among the members of the Common
Market; three, to form a "common market for consumers" with equal protection against
damages caused by defective products. Proposed E.E.C. Directive, Preamble. In the Explan-
atory Memorandum, the drafters note that consumer protection varies considerably as be-
tween the member nations and, in the majority, the consumer may be without protection if
he is required to prove fault. See Proposed E.E.C. Directive, Memorandum, para. 1 (1976).
Although the validity of the stated reasons given for the necessity for uniformity has been
questioned, see Storm, Introduction to ASSOCIATION EUROPEENNE D'ETtUEs JURmiQuES ET
FiscALEs, PRODUCT LIABIrrY IN EUROPE 20-21 (1975); VON HOLSEN, supra note 101, at 38-39,
there is disparity in the treatment of products liability law in the Member States, see H.
TEBBENS, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT LIABILITY 47-118 (1979), and some commentators favor
some form of harmonization. See, e.g., STORM, supra, at 19; Fleming, Draft Convention on
Products Liability (Council of Europe), 23 Am. J. CoMP. L. 729, 729 (1975); Hanotiau, The
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tection is certainly worth every endeavor, the "whereas" clauses
quoted above actually raise fundamental questions as to whether
the assumed premises on which the Directive is based are correct.
Therefore, serious doubt exists that the goal is being achieved.
Fundamental questions remain:
(1) To what extent does a very strict products liability law pro-
vide incentives to improve safety?
(2) Are higher burdens of manufacturer's liability really in the
general interest and, if so, what level of burden should be
imposed?
(3) What principles, other than a mere desire to compensate in-
jured persons, justify imposing the costs of damages on other per-
sons who have behaved in a lawful and socially desirable manner?
Before these questions are answered, it must be noted that there
are major factual differences between industrial manufacture and
the design process.10 5 The process of mass manufacture is a highly
mechanized operation, as illustrated by the use of industrial robots
and automatic welding. Failures and failure rates are calculable by
reference to probabilities. In general, the growth of mechanization
coupled with selective quality control methods based upon ac-
cepted mathematical laws permits, in most cases, the achievement
of a high probability of defect-free production. The design process,
on the other hand, has been and continues to be a creative activity,
dependent, for the most part, upon individual value judgments.
"Design" is not a mechanized process and, therefore, its outcome is
much less calculable. 0 6
Council of Europe Convention on Products Liability, S GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 325, 340
(1978).
105 See notes 5, 6 & 17 and accompanying text supra.
106 One theoretical basis for risk spreading in strict liability rests on the premise that
the manufacturer can minimize the sum of two variables: cost of injury and cost of injury
avoidance. Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufacture, 52
TEx. L. Rev. 81, 84 (1973). In the design area, however, the second variable is not easily
achieved:
It includes not one, but many variables, of which the dollar cost of altering the
finished product may be the least significant. In the case of an automobile design
change to achieve greater safety, for example, the costs may involve sacrifices, not
only in price, but also in style and utility .... The manufacturer must... con-
sider the cost of investment necessary to produce desired changes. . . . If, for ex-
ample, an entire plant must be abandoned before its construction costs have been
recovered, the expense may prevent the desired change. Finally, the manufacturer
must consider the cost of gathering the information necessary to calculate the
other costs.
Id. at 85 (footnote omitted).
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Apart from the failure to make this necessary factual distinc-
tion, another major deficiency of the rationales stated in the Direc-
tive may be discerned. The "whereas" clauses, surprisingly, fail to
mention that the design, manufacture, and distribution of products
is not only a lawful and highly desirable activity but a general ba-
sis for modern man's existence. The traditional law of civilization
is that lawful and responsible conduct by one person will not be
punished by his obligation to pay compensation to another. This
legal principle encourages socially desirable and beneficial behavior
while discouraging unlawful behavior via the mechanism of the in-
jured person's right to claim damages from the wrongdoer or
tortfeasor. These dynamics function in the products liability field
as well.107
The Draft Directive deviates from the basic approach. Instead
of stating a rationale that encourages responsible design behavior,
it emphasizes the theory of risk spreading. 10 8 While a risk-spread-
ing rationale arguably has some value in connection with manufac-
turing defects which, by their nature are calculable, it is a totally
insufficient basis for imposing a strict liability for design errors and
development risks. 09
The risk-spreading rationale appears to be so highly regarded
because, upon first impression, it seems like an intelligent and
purely economic approach to the problem of compensating injured
persons. Indeed, it was mentioned in the California case which first
adopted strict liability.'1 0 It is apparent upon closer evaluation,
however, that "risk spreading" is an inappropriate rationale to ap-
ply to design activities.""1 The serious limitations of risk spreading
1 7 See Schwartz, Introduction to Student Forum on the Model Uniform Product Lia-
bility Act, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 113, 115 (1980). Professor Schwartz stated:
Product Liability Law, of course, is a branch of the law of torts. Tort law shifts
the cost of an accident from a claimant to a defendant when the latter is deemed
"responsible" for the claimant's injuries. Any party that drafts a product liability
law has the burden to define that responsibility in terms that all can understand.
Product liability should indicate why a particular product seller is sufficiently re-
sponsible that it, as opposed to society in general or the injured party, should bear
the cost of that injury.
Id.
1o8 See E.E.C. Directive, supra note 97, Preamble.
100 See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
110 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
" Design cases do not involve the failure of one part out of many other identical parts
to conform to the precise specifications set for that part. Rather, a design claim charges that
a manufacturer's value judgment for the entire line of parts was wrong. See notes 5, 6 & 106
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as an ultimate rationale for strict liability in design cases are evi-
dent from the very concept itself.112 Moreover, if compensation by
"spreading the risk" is the main objective, the theory would be
equally valid in justifying compensation for all injuries caused by
all products even if they were not defective." 8 This is because the
manufacturer is the superior risk bearer regardless of the defec-
tiveness of its product. Why, then, consider it as a selective ratio-
nale for defective products only?
To illustrate, the Commission's Explanatory Memorandum to
the Proposed Directive clarifies that known but unavoidable side
effects would create no liability if a proper warning was given." 4
However, in one of the "whereas" clauses liability would be im-
posed for unknown side effects-development risk liability." 5 If
compensation via risk spreading is the key, why distinguish be-
tween the two circumstances? In both cases the person is injured
while using the product and in both cases the manufacturer is the
superior risk bearer. Yet liability is imposed in one situation and
excluded in the other. Obviously, risk spreading does not ade-
quately explain the difference in result.
In fact, risk spreading is a somewhat dangerous rationale to
emphasize in the "whereas" clauses because judges who later have
to construe the Directive will look to the underlying rationale con-
tained therein to fathom just how strict the liability should be.
and accompanying text supra.
112 The risk spreading justification for the imposition of strict liability is that the man-
ufacturer is the superior risk bearer because of his ability to obtain insurance and to spread
the cost among consumers. See Proposed E.E.C. Directive, Preamble. In the area of design
defects, however, the magnitude of the potential liability raises the question of whether a
manufacturer can afford to insure himself even if insurance is available. See Gibson, When
Lawyers Prosper, Forbes, Mar. 30, 1981, at 43; Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort
Liability: Is There a Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 109, 130 (1976). The small manu-
facturer may not be in a position to bear the costs of liability insurance with the result that
he may be forced out of business. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d
843, 846 (1978). See also Henderson, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product De-
sign: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C.L. lEv. 625, 627 & n.16 (1978).
I" See Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. Rv.
643, 659-60 (1978); Hoenig, supra note 112, at 130. As Professor Epstein notes:
If redistribution [of costs] is desired there is no reason why the law should retain
the requirements of causation and product defect; to the extent that any defen-
dant can rely upon those requirements to defeat a plaintiff's cause of action, this
"policy" of tort law will be defeated.... One might as well say that any judg-
ment for the defendant frustrates that policy.
Id. at 659-60.
11 E.E.C. Memorandum, para. 13 (1976).
" See text accompanying note 99 supra.
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Since risk spreading theory tends towards a liability for all dam-
ages that can mathematically be spread by superior risk bearers, it
has a built-in inertia towards absolute liability."' It is common
opinion, however, that absolute liability is to be avoided. 1 7
Some other rationale, therefore, must be articulated to justify
liability for a manufacturer's design choices. That other rationale
can only be based upon some fault principle. In other words, there
must be some yardstick for objectively measuring the appropriate-
ness of a design decision so as to blame the manufacturer and
make him pay for damages because the decision was a wrong one.
A rationale based upon fault or objective blameworthiness has the
advantage of offering a much more powerful incentive to design
responsibility than a strict liability tending towards absolute liabil-
ity. This is because the responsible manufacturer will be rewarded
by a finding of no liability while the irresponsible one will be pun-
ished. Under a form of strict liability that approximates the abso-
lute, both manufacturers will be punished when injury occurs.
Therefore, we can conclude that a strict liability based solely upon
risk spreading, as opposed to fault, actually discourages safer or
more responsible designs.11
Another deficiency in the Draft Directive is the inadequate
treatment of state of the art as an influential factor in gauging de-
sign responsibility. When the Commission says in the last
"whereas" clause quoted above1 9 that it would be unreasonable to
make the producer liable for an unlimited period "because the
state of science and technology progresses," there appears to be
some hint that a retrospective, hindsight form of design liability
should not be imposed. However, upon closer scrutiny, this hint of
a restriction upon the extent of liability is really not based on state
of the art considerations. The primary purpose behind this
"whereas" clause is merely to justify an appropriate period of time
beyond which there is claims exclusion-a kind of statute of limi-
tations.120 The Directive's proposed period for this purpose is ten
... See Owen, supra note 15, at 707; Schwartz supra note 108, at 117.
. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
18 See note 101 supra.
119 See text accompanying note 99 supra.
12 The E.E.C. draft contains two time limitation periods. Article 8 allows a claimant to
bring suit within three years of the date of damage or injury or when he "should reasonably
have become aware of the damage, the defect and the identity of the producer." E.E.C.
Draft Directive, art. 8. This is a relatively flexible standard favorable to a claimant, but it
may hamper litigation because of its vagueness. See H. TEBBENS, supra note 96, at 152. The
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years.121 Thus, within the prescribed 10-year period, a product de-
sign could still be declared defective by a retroactive or hindsight
test which relies upon technical solutions that only became known
after manufacture but within the 10-year period. If the "whereas"
clause is misinterpreted in this way, state of the art considerations
obviously will not be given their proper role in restricting liabil-
ity.122 Statements made by the Commission in various parts of the
Explanatory Memoranda, to the effect that a liability by hindsight
should not be imposed, do not remedy the potential for misinter-
pretation deriving from the "whereas" clauses, since the latter are
an integral part of the Draft Directive, while the Explanatory
Memoranda are not.
A more substantial hint that state of the art has a logical role
to play is the amended definition of "defect" contained in article 4
of the Directive. The amendment had added the portions which
are italicized:
A product is defective when, being used for the purpose for
which it is apparently intended, it does not provide for persons
or property the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking
second time limitation extinguishes the liability of a producer. if an action is not brought
within ten years from the date in which the product was first marketed. E.E.C. Draft Direc-
tive, art. 9. The drafters specifically noted that this provision was necessary to protect pro-
ducers from "development risks" so that "an inordinately high risk" would not be imposed.
See E.E.C. Directive, Memorandum, para. 28 (1976).
In line with a desire to facilitate the availability of insurance, the E.E.C. draft contains
maximum monetary recoveries with a provision for periodic revision of the amounts recover-
able. See E.E.C. Draft Directive, art. 7. But cf. E. KLINGMOLLER, Insurance Law and Prod-
uct Liability in PRODucT LiAmB.rry INA Am aND SPACE TRANSPORTATION 55, 65 (1978) (draft
does not remove all the difficulties in calculating reasonable insurance premiums to meet
actual market conditions).
12' E.E.C. Directive, supra note 96, art. 9.
"1 That the imposition of a hindsight liability was not the intent of the Commission is
shown by the Explanatory Memorandum which accompanied the 1976 version of the Draft
Directive. E.E.C. Directive Memorandum, para. 13. The Memorandum indicates that under
some circumstances the consumer bears a part of the risk. For example, when the consumer
elects to use a drug that may cause an allergic reaction, the producer is liable "only where
he has failed to point out such generally known risks in presenting his product. .. ." Id.
Similarly, a person who chooses to use a worn product "runs a higher risk than someone
who uses a brand new product" and "is not entitled to expect the same degree of safety
... ." Id. In both of the foregoing examples, the Memorandum indicates that there will be
no liability unless the defect existed when the product was first marketed. Moreover, the
same considerations preclude liability "where safety regulations are tightened up after a
product has been put into circulation," id., or where post-manufacture design changes have
been made, Official Commission Document, Coin (79) 415 (1979), at 4. The consumer who
then chooses to use such a product "does so at his oivn risk." E.E.C. Memorandum, para. 13
(1976).
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into account all the circumstances, including the presentation
and the time at which it was put into circulation.123
Despite the supplementary language, article 4 continues to use one
definition for manufacturing and design defects as well as for de-
fective warnings and instructions. 124 It also continues to emphasize
the consumer expectations test, a legal standard that is imprecise
and subjective.125 The words embodying the expectations test
should be replaced with something indicating a more objective
standard, for example, "legitimate safety requirements."
The amended portion at least declares that courts deciding de-
sign issues must take into account all the circumstances at the
time the product was put into circulation. The only way this may
be understood properly is to read into it the relevance of technical
feasibility and economic practicability at the time the product is
circulated. It would appear, therefore, that a product complying
with the state of the art is not defective under article 4 of the Di-
rective.12 It may be said that the article 4 definition, as to design
defects, approaches the rationale of objective blameworthiness.
The article 4 definition would also appear to cover the perti-
nence of scientific knowledge at the time of manufacture. Thus, if
the product was made at a time when the risk was undetectable in
light of the scientific knowledge then prevailing, there should be no
finding of defect. The definition of defect may be said, therefore,
to exclude liability for development risks. The serious problem is
that this rationale conflicts with the statement in the "whereas"
clauses that liability for development risks is not at all excluded
from the Draft Directive.127 This significant conflict has been noted
by the British House of Lords. 2 '
The Commission's intention to impose liability for dangerous
aspects of products scientifically undetectable at the time the
product was circulated stems from the Commission's attempt to
121 E.E.C. Directive, supra note 96, art. 4 (1979) (emphasis added.)
'24 See id. Since the definition of defect must be read in light of the accompanying
explanatory reports to be fully understood, uniformity of application may not occur. H.
TBENS, supra note 96, at 150.
125 See notes 54 & 55 and accompanying text supra. See also H. TEBBENs, supra note
96, at 150.
26 See also note 122 supra.
117 Compare E.E.C. Directive, supra note 96, art. 4 (1979) with id., Preamble.
128 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities Liability for De-
fective Products (50th Report), Apr. 22, 1980; 2 PROD. LIAB. INT'L §§ 31-36, at 152-53 (1980).
See generally 39 CAMBRMDGE L.J. 263 (1980).
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characterize development risks as yet another form of product de-
fect. The result is an irreconcilable conflict with the article 4 at-
tempt to define design defect. 129 The Commission probably should
have stated forthrightly that manufacturers' liability is being ex-
tended beyond defective products even to development risks for
reasons of consumer protection. That this is indeed the Commis-
sion's intention is seen from a 1976 Explanatory Memorandum. 30
In fact, however, the Directive's article 1, paragraph 2 goes even
further by stating that "[t]he producer shall be liable even if the
article could not have been regarded as defective in the light of the
scientific and technological development at the time when he put
the article into circulation."' 31 Article 1 may very well mean that a
product design will be regarded as improper some years later when
the state of the art has changed in the normal course of advancing
technology. Taken literally, article 1, paragraph 2 therefore im-
poses a retroactive liability upon the manufacturer who complied
with the state of the art at the time of manufacture. This contra-
venes the article 4 definition of defect, which obligates the court to
take into account all circumstances at the time of circulation.3 2
Even if courts were to cure the inconsistency between the two
provisions by only applying article 1, paragraph 2 to really unde-
tectable development risks, the position taken in article 1 is incon-
sistent with general principles of products liability for defective
products. It is unjustified and unfair because it constitutes an or-
der to avoid the unavoidable. As shown above, even the risk-
spreading rationale does not provide a basis for support.3 3 Article
l's imposition of liability is also anti-innovative, since it stifles the
incentive to develop new products. This is precisely the reason why
the United States Government does not propose a liability for de-
velopment risks in the Uniform Product Liability Act'3 and why
American courts consistently reject such a liability.13 5 For Euro-
pean industry, in particular, the matter is critical in light of indus-
trial competition posed by Japan. European industry must stay
129 It should be noted that article 4 continues to use one single definition for manufac-
turing and design defects, as well as for "defective" warnings and instructions. See note 124
supra.
130 See E.E.C. Memorandum, para. 2 (1976); note 102 supra.
131 E.E.C. Directive, supra note 96, art. 1 (2) (1979) (emphasis added).
1 E.E.C. Directive, supra note 96, art. 4 (1979); text accompanying note 124 supra.
1 See notes 101, 106-113 and accompanying text supra.
134 Note 86 supra.
1-5 Note 26 supra.
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competitive by innovating and maintaining a technological lead. A
strict liability that later punishes a European manufacturer, de-
spite its compliance with the state of the art of the time, frustrates
the objective of promoting new development and puts the Euro-
pean manufacturer at a disadvantage. Japan, for example, is not at
all likely to introduce liability for development risks.1 s Indeed,
Japan does not even impose strict liability for design defects.
Thus, a failure to give proper weight to state of the art factors may
have an effect on prices, jobs, and international commerce that ex-
tends beyond the products liability arena.
One may well ask, however, what remedy then is available for
the consumer who is injured by a product which only many years
later proves to be dangerous? The answer to this question is the
same as it has always been. Where consumers have no possibility
to recover for damages they sustain, society so far has protected
such persons by providing financial aid within a framework of
ever-expanding social security.13 7 This is already the appropriate
and operative answer in Europe to "development risks." s
Ise For a comparative analysis of products liability law in Japan and other countries,
see Orban, supra note 96.
137 It has been suggested that victims of damages caused by defective products should
be "compensated through social security benefits with a disallowance of subrogation against
non-negligent manufacturers. See von Hflsen, The Status of Product Liability de lege lata
and de lege ferenda in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Europe as seen by Indus-
try, in PRODUCT LiABILrrY IN Am AND SPACE TRANSPORTATION 45 (K.H. Bckstiegel ed. 1978).
For recent trends in this direction, see ASSOCIATION EUROPEENNE D'ETUDES JURIDIQUES ET
FISCALES, PRODUcTs LiABiLrry IN EUROPE 21, 50-51, 98-99 (1975). For the argument that
national health insurance might alleviate the "product liability crisis" in America, see Or-
ban, supra note 96, at 394-95.
Alternatively, if social policy mandates that compensation be provided for victims of
design and development risks, other means are possible with a less drastic impact on design
innovation. See O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability by Contract-With or Without an
Enabling Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 59, 62-65; see also Keeton, Products Liability, 50 F.R.D.
338, 340 (1971). For a discussion of New Zealand's accident compensation plan, see Orban,
supra note 96.
138 The European Social Security system has, at times, been supplemented by further
legislative action. As a result of the thalidomide experience, for example, special legislation
was enacted in West Germany imposing liability on the pharmaceutical industry which sets
a maximum amount of recovery per claimant per year. See Gesetz Zur Neuordnunz des
Arzneimittelrechtes (Revised Pharmaceutical Law), Aug. 24, 1976, Bundesgesetzblatt (BGB)
I 2445 (W.Ger.). See also H. TEBBENS, supra note 96, at 139-41. The creation of a special
fund for development risks has been suggested by the European Parliament. Resolution of
the European Parliament Apr. 26, 1979; see v. Hillsen, 1979 RIW/AWD, at 376. See also
Massam, 1 PROD. LIAB. INT'L 162, 165 (1980), who favors a general fund for all product
related injuries.
DESIGN LIABILITY
Repair of the Draft Directive
Among the changes that should be made in the Draft Direc-
tive are the following:
Article 1, paragraph 2 should exclude liability for development
risks where the solution is and should be social security assistance.
If the future indicates that something more is required, the crea-
tion of a special fund may be considered, as was suggested by the
European Parliament.139 Additionally, a definition of development
risk must be devised which avoids confusion or potential conflict
with the definition of design defects. Such a definition should
cover only the instances where unacceptably dangerous aspects of
a product were scientifically undetectable.
The definition of design defect must be phrased more objec-
tively. The interests of consumers and manufacturers are better
served by a standard of responsibility that provides the greatest
legal certainty without becoming inflexible. In this respect the ex-
pectations test currently proposed promotes uncertainty and
should be deleted. As has been demonstrated above, the most im-
portant factor to be considered in article 4's definition is the state
of the art prevailing at the time a product was circulated. This
should either be expressly mentioned in article 4 itself or a further
"whereas" clause should be added to the official text of the Draft
Directive perhaps along the following lines:
Whereas the safety to be provided by the design of products and
by necessary instructions and warnings shall be established in the
light of the scientific knowledge, technical feasibility and eco-
nomic practicability prevailing at the time the product was put
into circulation.
Additionally, the "whereas" clause dealing with the risk-distri-
bution rationale should be limited to manufacturing defects only.
If the foregoing changes are made to the "whereas" clauses,
then, and only then, will the error in attempting to have one single
definition for manufacturing, design and warning or instruction de-
fects be partially remedied.
CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the American development of strict tort
liability there still remains some confusion about the rightful role
139 See note 138 supra.
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of state of the art as a major factor that should properly influence
the scope and extent of design liability. When the various evolved
tests of product design liability are analyzed, it is seen that they
either explicitly or implicitly refer to state of the art criteria to
some extent. The best approach to date, however, is the explicit
and objective proposal of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act
where the relevant scientific, economic and technological factors at
the time of manufacture must be considered. A standard of liabil-
ity that is oriented around state of the art criteria is fair, promotes
responsible behavior and product development, encourages re-
search, and balances the need of the injured consumer to be com-
pensated against the actual culpability of the manufacturer, as
measured at the critical time of manufacture.
The parallel effort in Europe to state properly a law of prod-
ucts liability through a proposed Draft Directive, however, falls
short of its goal primarily because it fails to accord state of the art
its proper role in product design claims resolution. Incredibly, the
Directive would even impose liability for development risks,
though technically and scientifically undetectable at the time of
manufacture. If the Directive is going to responsibly meet the true
objectives of products law, rather than merely act to compensate
the injured, it will require a number of changes. Among the fore-
most is the recognition that design liability must be based upon
fault and limited by state of the art factors prevailing at the time
of manufacture.
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